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CRIMINAL LAW-New Mexico Rejects the "Lewd and
Lascivious" Exception to Rule 404(B): State v. Lucero
I.

INTRODUCTION

In State v. Lucero' the New Mexico Court of Appeals held that evidence
of prior sexual conduct of the defendant is not admissible under Rule
404(B), where the proponent of the evidence does not provide an adequate
basis for the court to conclude that the evidence is relevant. 2 The court
further held that New Mexico does not accept the "lewd and lascivious"
exception to Rule 404(B).' In Lucero, the court of appeals attempted to
clarify New Mexico law concerning the admissibility of prior acts in
sexual misconduct cases. This Note discusses the "lewd and lascivious"
exception to Rule 404(B), explores the rationale of Lucero, and examines
the policy implications of refusing to apply the exception in New Mexico
courts.
II.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

The state convicted Lucero of attempted criminal sexual penetration
of a minor, criminal sexual penetration of a minor, criminal sexual contact
of a minor and kidnapping.4 Lucero allegedly asked the victim, then
seven years old, to his house and then proceeded to take off her clothes,
as well as his own. The victim testified that Lucero attempted to "put
his penis into her vagina, inserted his fingers into her vagina, and put
his penis into her mouth."
At trial, the State called Lucero's ex-girlfriend, Diane. On direct examination, the prosecution attempted to elicit information concerning
Lucero's prior sexual acts with Diane. The court sustained an objection
by Lucero and rejected the State's argument that the evidence was "extremely important to prove motive, intent and lack of mistake." However,
on cross-examination of Lucero, the State asked Lucero to agree that
he and Diane had argued concerning her refusal to perform anal and
oral sex. Lucero disagreed. Subsequently, the State recalled Diane and
the court allowed her to testify that she and Lucero had argued a number
of times about her refusal to engage in anal and oral sex. 5
Lucero appealed his convictions citing a number of errors. The court
of appeals reversed and remanded on the grounds that admitting Diane's
testimony concerning the couple's sexual acts was prejudicial error. 6 The
State did not proffer any specific exception under Rule 404(B), nor did

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

114 N.M. 489, 840 P.2d 1255 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 114 N.M. 413, 839 P.2d 623 (1992).
Id. Judge Black wrote the opinion for the court with Judges Minzner and Apodaca concurring.
Id.
Id. at 491, 840 P.2d at 1257.
Id.
Id. at 492, 840 P.2d at 1258.
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it request the application of the "lewd and lascivious" exception in order
to have Diane's testimony admitted. Nevertheless, the court of appeals
discussed the exception and engaged in a lengthy colloquy on whether
to apply the exception to 404(B). 7 The court ultimately held that the
"lewd and lascivious disposition" exception is not applicable in New
Mexico. 8
HISTORICAL AND CONTEXTUAL BACKGROUND

III.

Rule 404(B) renders evidence of prior acts for the purpose of establishing
the defendant's character inadmissible, unless the proponent of the evidence has established the relevance of the evidence for a purpose falling
under an exception to 404(B). 9 The "lewd and lascivious" exception is
not listed in the Federal Rules of Evidence. However, because the list
of exceptions is not exhaustive, both federal and state courts have permitted prior acts to be introduced under Rule 404(B) where the proponent
of the evidence establishes a relevant basis of admission for a permissible
purpose.' 0 The following is an analysis of how courts of other jurisdictions,
as well as New Mexico, have dealt with a sexual misconduct exception
to Rule 404(B).
Federal Jurisdictions' Positions on the Exception to Rule 404(B)
Federal jurisdictions are divided on the definitive limits of admissibility
of other acts in sexual misconduct cases. No circuit has gone so far as
to accept and apply the "lewd and lascivious" exception. At least one
circuit" represents a more liberal medium between the two extremes. But
the majority of the circuits have held that the Federal Rules of Evidence
should not be overridden, even when circumstances may pose unique

A.

problems. 12
However, the Ninth Circuit has taken a middle position with respect
to the question of creating an exception to Rule 404(B) in sexual misconduct cases. 3 In United States v. Hadley the court allowed evidence
of defendant's prior acts of sexual abuse where the acts were similar to
the offenses charged and were used to exhibit intent of the defendant
in the case at bar.' 4 The defendant in Hadley was charged with eleven
counts of sexual abuse of minors. 5 Although the court in Hadley de-

7. N.M. R. Evnr. 11-404(B).
8. Lucero, 114 N.M. 484, 840 P.2d 1255.
9. FED. R. Evro. 404(B). In 1973, New Mexico adopted the federal rules. See N.M. R. Evm.
11-404(B).
10. See, e.g., State v. Lara, 109 N.M. 294, 296, 784 P.2d 1037, 1039 (Ct. App. 1989).
11. See United States v. Hadley, 918 F.2d 848 (9th Cir. 1990), cert. granted, 112 S. Ct. 1261
(1992), and cert. dismissed, 113 S. Ct. 486 (1992).
12. See Government of Virgin Islands v. Archibald, 987 F.2d 180 (3d Cir. 1993); see also United
States v. Fawbush, 900 F.2d 150 (8th Cir. 1990) (Admissible evidence is that which operates within
the rules and should be allowed only for a relevant, established permissible purpose.).
13. Hadley, 918 F.2d 848.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 850.
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termined that prior bad acts must fall under an accepted exception to
404(B), it admitted evidence of prior acts with someone other than the
prosecuting victim.' 6 Thus, while avoiding any express exception to 404(B)
in the case of sexual misconduct, the court found that the prior acts
were indicative of the defendant seeking out activities "of a sexually
gratifying nature," which the court found to be relevant to the defendant's
intent. 7 Apart from determining that the evidence was offered for the
relevant, material issue of specific intent,"8 the court also noted that it
would allow the prior acts evidence because it found that the acts "have
to do with alleged activities of [the defendant], of a sexually gratifying
nature."' 9 One might conclude that while jurisdictions such as the Ninth
Circuit do not intend to create or codify a special exception for sexual
misconduct cases, courts may use their discretion to consider admission
of prior acts in a more liberal manner in order to deal with evidentiary
difficulties2° and public policy concerns.
Before New Mexico adopted the Federal Rules of Evidence in 1973,
the Tenth Circuit, in United States v. Burkhart, held prior acts inadmissable on the basis of a "similar offense theory."'2' The court placed
the emphasis on keeping character evidence out, because "too often we
lose sight of the fact that the [federal] rule is primarily a rule of exclusion
of evidence and not one of admission ....-22 Although Burkhart did
not involve an issue of sexual misconduct, the court's thorough analysis
is helpful in attempting to sort out the admissibility of evidence of prior
acts and the consequences of admitting such evidence. Such evidence
could conceivably prejudice the jury by interjecting the prior acts with
those alleged in the case at bar, resulting in confusion and possible
conviction, not for the crime charged in the instant case, but for retribution
for the prior acts. 23 The constant concern of unfair prejudice against the
16. Id. at 851.
17. Id. The court looked to the following three factors in concluding that the evidence was
probative of the defendant's intent: a) Could the jury reasonably conclude that the prior acts
occurred and that defendant was the actor? b) Was the event in question too remote in time? c)
Was the prior act introduced to prove a material element of the case? Id.
18. See id. On appeal, the defendant in Hadley unsuccessfully attempted to argue that intent
was not a material issue. Id. It should be noted, however, that the law of Arizona includes specific
intent as an element of criminal sexual contact of a minor and criminal sexual penetration of a
minor, while New Mexico does not require the prosecution to prove the specific intent of the
defendant. See State v. Osborne, Ill N.M. 654, 656, 808 P.2d 624, 626 (1991).
19. Hadley, 918 F.2d 848.
20. See, e.g., State v. Lucero, 114 N.M. 489, 492-93, 840 P.2d 1255, 1258-59 (1992) (noting
that possible problems with prosecuting child sexual abuse cases include the need to bolster the
victim's credibility and the belief that sex crimes are more likely to follow a specific psychological
profile).
21. 458 F.2d 201, 205 (10th Cir. 1972) (Defendant was prejudiced by prior convictions admitted
at trial which were not connected with instant prosecution for transporting vehicles over state lines,
and were not offered for the purpose of establishing a common plan, scheme, design or intent.).
22. Id. at 204; see also Morgan v. United States, 355 F.2d 43 (10th Cir. 1966). The Morgan
majority was explicit in its view of the exclusionary nature of the rule of character evidence, stating:
"The [words] must be and will be realistically and closely defined and limited." Id. at 45.
23. Burkhart, 458 F.2d at 205 (citing Paris v. United States, 260 F. 529, 531 (8th Cir. 1919))
("Such evidence tends to draw the atttention of the jury away from a consideration of the real
issues on trial, to fasten it upon other questions, and to lead them unconsciously to render their
verdicts in accordance with their views on false issues rather than on the true issues on trial.").
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defendant may be one of the major reasons why despite differing interpretations of Rule 404(B), the circuits have refused to stretch the rule
to the extent of creating a "lewd and lascivious" exception.
B.

Other States' Treatment of the "Lewd and Lascivious" Exception
Considering the complexity of Rule 404(B), it is not surprising that
state courts also have diverse views on the creation of an exception
explicitly for sexual abuse cases. The states appear to illustrate three
positions concerning the admission of prior acts evidence in sexual misconduct cases. Some states maintain the Federal Rules of Evidence are
the final word on admission; others do not provide for an exception,
such as the "lewd and lascivious" exception, but do allow quite a bit
of judicial discretion as to admission of prior acts, and some states have
adopted the "lewd and lascivious" exception in cases involving sexual
misconduct.
At one end of the spectrum are states like New Mexico 4 which base
their decisions on the admissibility of evidence on their adopted versions
of the Federal Rules of Evidence and maintain that any prior acts evidence
must definitively fall within an exception to Rule 404(B). In State v.
Courter,25 the Missouri Court of Appeals indicated that it would not
extend Rule 404(B) exceptions to create a specific exception for "sexual
aberrations," unless the evidence was offered to establish proof of one
of the established categories of exceptions, i.e., motive, intent, identity,
common scheme or plan. 26 Because the court held that evidence of prior
acts was admissible only where it fit into an existing category of exceptions,
the existence of a sexual aberration exception or "lewd and lascivious"
exception became moot. The court pointed out that the sexual aberration
exception would allow the prosecution to establish that the defendant
has depraved sexual instincts, and determined that this was essentially
inadmissible propensity evidence.2 7
States which have taken the middle ground have allowed wider discretion
with regard to admission of prior acts, while avoiding the creation of
an exception specifically for sexual misconduct cases. The Wisconsin
Court of Appeals has declared that cases dealing with sex crimes, "especially those dealing with incest and indecent liberties with a child,"
merit a "greater latitude of proof" as to other like occurrences.2 8 Wisconsin, among other states, has turned to a relaxation of Rule 404(B)
to circumvent the evidentiary problems of a young victim challenging the
credibility of the adult defendant.2 9 Despite the belief that these cases

24. But see infra section V. (Analysis and Implications) (discussing recent cases indicating a
trend toward the middle ground).
25. See State v. Courter, 793 S.W.2d 386 (Mo. App. 1990).
26. Id. at 389.
27. Id.
28. State v. Friedrich, 398 N.W.2d 763, 771 (Wis. 1987).
29. See Hendrickson v. State, 212 N.W.2d 481, 483 (Wis. 1973); see also People v. Covert, 57
Cal. Rptr. 220, 224 (Cal. App. 1967); State v. Jackson, 81 N.E.2d 546 (Ohio App. 1948).
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should represent an exception to the rule, these courts have been reluctant
to codify the exception. Nevertheless, by allowing evidence to be manipulated so as to fit an existing exception to Rule 404(B), these courts
are indicating that a certain amount of discretion is due sexual misconduct
cases.3 0
Finally, some states have created an exception to Rule 404(B) specifically
for sexual misconduct cases. 3 In Ohio, the courts decided as early as
1948 that admitting the prior acts of the defendant in a sexual molestation
case was indicative of the defendant's possession of a "degeneracy,"
which was probative of whether the defendant likely had the "same
emotion or [degeneracy] at the time in question.' '32 The court in State
v. Jackson, acknowledging that evidence of a defendant's propensity to
commit an act is generally inadmissable, distinguished the evidence of
"degeneracy" by suggesting that it is the specific type of character or
personality of sexual abusers which sets them apart from other violators
of the law.33
Another rationale for creating an exception to Rule 404(B) in sexual
offense cases includes the practical problem of corroborating the victim's
testimony. In Gezzi v. State,34 the Supreme Court of Wyoming stated
that "the victim's credibility or apparent lack thereof may be determinative," thus corroborative evidence is of high probative value. 5 This
policy consideration, as well as others involving concerns for protecting
children, have led some states3 6 to consider exceptions and to grant greater
discretion with respect to other acts evidence in sexual misconduct cases.
However, with Lucero, the New Mexico Court of Appeals clearly expressed
its intent not to join these states, but to remain well within the limits
of Rule 404(B).
C. New Mexico's Position on Prior Acts Evidence Before Lucero
In sexual misconduct cases, New Mexico courts have consistently accepted evidence of the defendant's past conduct with the prosecuting

30. See, e.g., Jackson, 81 N.E.2d 546.
Of course, there are jurisdictions which seem to be mired in the complexities inherent in Rule
404(B) and have thus far produced largely confusing opinions with respect to prior acts evidence
in sexual misconduct cases. See People v. Engelman, 453 N.W.2d 656, 661 (Mich. 1990) (using
heightened evidentiary standards "designed to protect against the misuse of other acts evidence"
but noting that Rule 404 is intended to be an inclusionary rule rather than an exclusionary one).
31. See Bowden v. State, 538 So. 2d 1226 (Ala. 1988); see also Soper v. State, 731 P.2d 587
(Alaska Ct. App. 1987); State v. Weatherbee, 762 P.2d 590 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1988).
32. Jackson, 81 N.E.2d at 548.
33. Id.
34. 780 P.2d 972 (Wyo. 1989).
35. Id. at 977 (quoting Robert N. Block, Defining Standardsfor Determining the Admissibility
of Evidence of Other Sex Offenses, 25 UCLA L. REv. 261, 286 (1977). In addition to admitting
such evidence to buttress the credibility of the victim, the court noted that if the accused has a
predilection to "deviant sexual practices," it would not be unreasonable for the trier of fact to
find him/her guilty in the instant case. Gezzi, 780 P.2d at 977.
36. See supra note 29.
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witness.1 7 In fact, the lewd disposition exception was first introduced in

New Mexico in the context of prior acts of a defendant with a prosecuting
witness.3 ' The exception continued to be cited as support for admitting
testimony of prior acts involving the prosecuting witness, even after the
39
adoption of the rules of evidence.
However, prior acts which did not involve the victim raise a different
standard of admissibility. Although courts in New Mexico have not defined
the limits of the exclusion of evidence of prior sexual acts with someone
other than the prosecuting witness, they have long excluded such evidence
from admission at trial" 0 Before Lucero, New Mexico courts had not
yet considered whether the "lewd and lascivious" exception would apply
to a defendant's acts with someone other than the prosecuting witness.
Prior to the adoption of the rules of evidence in New Mexico, the
common law test of admissibility of prior acts was one of relevance. 4 '
Courts recognized early on that admitting evidence of prior sexual acts
involved a great deal of risk and danger. 42 Consequently, the test became
a balancing act between the possible relevance to the current proceedings
and the possible adverse effect the evidence might have on the jury. 4
The common law relevancy requirement survived the adoption of the
rules of evidence in 1973. In State v. Ross,"4 the court of appeals
considered the threshold issue of relevancy and gave a cursory glance to

37. State v. Minns, 80 N.M. 269, 454 P.2d 355 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 80 N.M. 234, 453
P.2d 597 (1969).
38. Id. The court in Minns relied on State v. Dodson, 67 N.M. 146, 353 P.2d 364 (1960), and
State v. Whitener, 25 N.M. 20, 175 P. 870 (1918), for 'the admissibility of prior acts to show the
disposition of the defendant. However, these cases held that the evidence was admissible to show
the "relation and familiarity of the parties" and to corroborate the victim's testimony. Dodson,
67 N.M. at 148, 353 P.2d at 366.
39. See State v. Mankiller, 104 N.M. 461, 469, 722 P.2d 1183, 1191 (Ct. App. 1986) (court
admitted pornographic photographs of one of the victims found in the defendant's motel room);
see also State v. Scott, 113 N.M. 525, 528, 828 P.2d 958, 961 (1991) (Defendant's previous sexual
misconduct involving prosecuting witness was similar in nature to misconduct alleged at trial, and
thus was admitted as "illustrative of a lewd and lascivious disposition of defendant toward the
victim.").
40. State v. Mason, 79 N.M. 663, 667, 448 P.2d 175, 179 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 79 N.M.
688, 448 P.2d 489 (1968).
41. See id., at 666, 448 P.2d at 178. The court deemed a prior act of sexual misconduct not
involving the victim to be a "collateral offense" and "wholly irrelevant" to the instant case.
42. Id. at 667, 448 P.2d at 179. The Mason court noted the importance of balancing the probative
value of the evidence versus the possible prejudicial effect which is now codified in N.M. R. Evm.
11-403.
43. See Mason, 79 N.M. at 667, 448 P.2d at 179.
44. State v. Ross, 88 N.M. 1, 3, 536 P.2d 265, 267 (Ct. App. 1975) (Evidence of a collateral
matter is irrelevant to the case at bar and is generally inadmissible.). A considerable amount of
confusion has surrounded the question of what actually is relevant to the charges of Criminal Sexual
Contact of a Minor (CSCM) and Criminal Sexual Penetration of a Minor (CSPM). Current law
seems to indicate that CSCM does not require proof of specific intent on the part of the defendant.
However, the supreme court has held a jury instruction on general intent to be insufficient. State
v. Osborne, 111 N.M. 654, 660, 808 P.2d 624, 630. The court suggested an instruction requiring
the jury to find that the defendant acted in a "manner calculated to arouse or gratify sexual desire,
or which otherwise intruded upon the child's bodily integrity or personal safety." Id. at 660, 808
P.2d at 630; see also State v. Pierce, 110 N.M. 76, 83, 792 P.2d 408, 415 (1990) (Conviction for
CSCM or CSPM does necessitate proving that the defendant acted unlawfully and intentionally.).
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the exceptions under the newly adopted Rule 404(B). Even at that early
stage, New Mexico courts appeared reticent to construe 404(B) outside
the limited categories of exceptions which the state had acquired from
the federal rules. 45
With the adoption of the rules of evidence, prosecutors were given a
higher standard to meet when attempting to introduce prior acts evidence.4
The federal rules had established a list of exceptions which had to be
considered.4 7 Thus, prior acts evidence had to be relevant to a material
issue in the case and fall within an exception to 404(B).4 Comfortable
with the existing exceptions, New Mexico case law indicates a conservative
tendency concerning the rules of evidence. Indeed, the court of appeals
may have been waiting for a case such as Lucero, in which it felt justified
to strike down the "lewd and lascivious" exception in an attempt to
clarify Rule 404(B).
IV.

RATIONALE OF THE COURT IN LUCERO

The court in Lucero found that defendant's prior conduct with his exgirlfriend was inadmissible based on a two-step test using Rules 404(B)
and 403.49 The threshold question the court asked was whether the
proffered evidence was relevant for any admissible purpose.50 Then, assuming the proponent of the evidence had adequately established its
relevance to the proceedings for an admissible purpose under Rule 404(B),
the court considered whether the probative value of the evidence was
"substantially outweighed" by other considerations."
The court of appeals found that Rule 404(B) "requires counsel to
identify the consequential fact to which the proffered evidence of other
acts is directed.' '52 The State did not offer Defendant's prior sexual
activities with his ex-girlfriend for any purpose other than to show his

45. See Ross, 88 N.M. at 3, 536 P.2d at 267 (court limited admission of evidence to the language
of the new state rules of evidence in all areas of the law); see also State v. Bazan, 90 N.M. 209,
561 P.2d 482 (Ct. App.), cert. quashed, 90 N.M. 254, 561 P.2d 1347 (1977) (in prosecution of
assault charges, state was not allowed to introduce evidence of prior acts because they were not
being introduced to prove an element of the crime charged, or to establish any factor within the
exceptions to Rule 404(B)).
46. See State v. Dodson, 67 N.M. 146, 148, 353 P.2d 364, 366 (1960) ("Whenever the proof
of another act or crime tends to prove the guilt of the person on trial, it is admissible, notwithstanding
the consequences to the defendant.") (quoting State v. Bassett, 26 N.M. 476, 478, 194 P. 867, 869
(1921)).
47. See Ross, 88 N.M. at 3, 536 P.2d at 267.
48. State v. Beachum, 96 N.M. 566, 568, 632 P.2d 1204, 1206 (Ct. App. 1981).
49. Lucero, 114 N.M at 494, 840 P.2d at 1260; N.M. R. Evm. 11-403 and 404(B).
50. Lucero, 114 N.M. at 492, 840 P.2d at 1258. As previously noted, Rule 404(B) does not
allow the admission of evidence in an attempt to show the character of the defendant or his/her
propensity to commit the crime alleged.
51. Id. "Other considerations" include the possible prejudicial consequences of allowing the
evidence before the jury, such that the "guilty verdict is a foregone conclusion." United States v.
Burkhart, 458 F.2d 201, 204 (10th Cir. 1972); see also Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Need to Amend
Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b): The Threat to the Future of the Federal Rules of Evidence, 30
VLL. L. REv. 1465, 1470 (1985).
52. Lucero, 114 N.M. at 492, 840 P.2d at 1258 (citing State v. Aguayo, 114 N.M. 124, 835
P.2d 840 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 113 N.M. 744, 832 P.2d 1223 (1992)).
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desire to engage in such activities. 53 Because propensity is clearly inadmissable according to Rule 404(B), the court considered possible exceptions
which might allow the admission of such evidence.5 4
Looking to the decisions of a number of other jurisdictions, the court
raised the proposition of applying the "lewd and lascivious" exception
to Rule 404(B).55 In its discussion the court noted that other states have
allowed more discretion in the admissibility of evidence of prior acts
with respect to sexual misconduct. 5 6 However, relying on a number of
authorities criticizing this exception 57 the court deemed the lewd disposition exception "nothing more than a euphemism for the character
evidence which Federal Rule of Evidence 404(B) and its state counterparts
'58
are designed to exclude."
The court acknowledged the possibility that a charge of sexual misconduct involving children could present evidentiary problems meriting
an exception to Rule 404(B).5 9 Prior acts appear to arise more often in
cases of child sexual abuse due to "the need to bolster the victim's
credibility" and "the belief that sex crimes alone are more likely to
follow a pattern based on the unique psychological profile of a likely
perpetrator.' ' However, the court refused to bypass the rule as a solution
to possible complications in prosecuting such crimes. 6' Finally, the court

rejected the evidence on relevance grounds. 62

Even though the sexual acts with Lucero's ex-girlfriend were not illegal,

the court considered the effect such testimony might have on jurors. 63
Some jurors might be offended by the nature of the acts; therefore, the

53. Lucero, 114 N.M. at 492, 840 P.2d at 1258.
54. Id. at 493-93, 840 P.2d at 1258-59. Had the State chosen to proffer any accepted exception
to Rule 404(B), the court might have at least considered the relevancy of the prior acts to the
crimes alleged. Indeed, the issue of intent might have been well argued, as it is a commonly used
exception to Rule 404(B). See, e.g., United States v. Hadley, 918 F.2d 848, 851 (9th Cir. 1990),
cert. granted, 112 S. Ct. 1261 (1992), and cert. dismissed, 113 S. Ct. 486 (1992).
55. Lucero, 114 N.M. at 492, 840 P.2d at 1258.
56. Id. (citing State v. Friedrich, 398 N.W.2d 763 (Wis. 1987)); see also supra note 34.
57. RicHARD 0. LEMPERT & STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG, A MODERN APPROACH TO EVIDENCE 230
(2d ed. 1982); Brian E. Lam, Note, The Admissibility of Prior Bad Acts in Sexual Assault Cases
Under Alaska Rule of Evidence 404(b)-An Emerging Double Standard, 5 Ai.AsA L. Rv. 193,
206 (1988); Haydn Winston, Casenote, Evidence-The Impotence of Wyoming Rule of Evidence
404 in Sex Crime Trials: Brown v. State, 736 P.2d 1110 (Wyo. 1987), 23 LAND & WATER L. Rv.
267, 274 (1988).
58. Lucero, 114 N.M. at 492-93, 840 P.2d at 1258-59.
59. Id. at 493, 840 P.2d at 1259.
60. Id. at 494, 840 P.2d at 1260; see Chris Hutton, Commentary: Prior Bad Acts Evidence in
Cases of Sexual Contact with a Child, 34 S.D. L. Rv. 604 (1989) (Child sexual abuse cases do
not seem to fit neatly into the existing exceptions to Rule 404(B) and the resulting action by some
courts is simply a manipulation of the rules.).
61. Lucero, 114 N.M. at 494, 840 P.2d at 1260. The court stated that "[w]hile we recognize
the potential difficulty in prosecuting such cases, then, we do not believe the appropriate solution
is to wink at the dictates of Rule 404(B)." Id.
62. Id. The court found no reasonable basis for the testimony for an "identified and legitimate"
purpose; consequently it held that the evidence had no probative value. Id.
63. Id. (trial court held that Defendant's requests to engage in anal and oral sex were "in
today's society . . . not aberrant"). But see N.M. STAT. ANN. § 20-12-57 (Repl. Pamp. 1989)
(prohibiting any "unnatural carnal copulation" under the New Mexico Military Code), cited in
Lucero, 114 N.M. at 494, 840 P.2d at 1260.
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court could not be sure that the evidence did not affect the result. 64 The

court noted that the prejudicial effect of prior bad acts can be particularly
powerful in child sexual abuse cases . 5 Thus, the court could not deem
the admission of the rebuttal testimony of the defendant's ex-girlfriend
harmless error. 6 By holding that the evidence of prior acts was irrelevant
and prejudicial, the court also came to its conclusion to reject the "lewd
and lascivious" exception.67 In so doing, the court attempted to dispel
some of the confusion surrounding Rule 404(B).
V.

ANALYSIS AND IMPLICATIONS

The court in Lucero chose to consider and affirmatively dismiss the
application of the lewd disposition exception in New Mexico, despite the

fact that the prosecution did not argue the exception in its case. In so
doing, the court attempted to accomplish a couple of goals. First, the

court endeavored to clarify the ambiguity inherent in Rule 404(B) 68 by

drawing a distinct line within the exceptions. It clearly established its

intention to abide by the rules of evidence in a strict mannerA9 In addition,

the court achieved its second goal of criticizing and rejecting the proposition that an exception should be created for admitting prior acts in

a sexual misconduct case.
The success of the court's efforts in Lucero may be considered in light
of subsequent cases involving the same issue. Despite a seemingly resolute
decision in Lucero, the cases which followed it do not appear to illustrate
such a strict adherence to the rules of evidence. The court held other

acts admissible in State v. Lamure,70 but cited Lucero in State v. Landers7 '
for the proposition that evidence of prior acts of the defendant with
someone other than the victim is inadmissible. It appears as though the
court flatly rejected the label of "lewd and lascivious" in order to admit
prior acts evidence with someone other than the prosecuting witness, but
limits of prior acts which
made little headway in its attempt to define 7the
2
may be admitted through other exceptions.

64. Lucero, 114 N.M. at 494, 840 P.2d at 1260.
65. Id. (citing Hutton, supra note 60, at 625-26) (evidence of prior bad acts in child sexual
abuse cases is outcome-determinative in most cases); see also Calvin W. Sharpe, Two-Step Balancing
and the Admissibility of Other Crimes Evidence: A Sliding Scale of Proof, 59 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 556, 560 (1984).
66. Lucero, 114 N.M. at 495, 840 P.2d at 1261.
67. Id. at 493, 840 P.2d at 1259.
68. See IA JoHN HENRY WIOMORE, EVDENCE § 54.1 n.2 (Tillers rev. 1983).
69. Lucero, 114 N.M. at 494, 840 P.2d at 1260.
70. 115 N.M. 61, 846 P.2d 1070 (Ct. App. 1992), cert. denied, 114 N.M. 720, 845 P.2d 814
(1993) (in pathologist's trial for sexual misconduct against an adolescent, court found that prior
sexual acts with one of the defendant's sons was probative of one of the established exceptions to
Rule 404(B), in addition to the fact that defendant "opened the door" for prosecution on rebuttal
by offering character trait). The majority's decision was the motivation for a lengthy concurrence
by Judge Hartz, in which he suggested that the majority did not understand the established exceptions
to Rule 404(B) and that the greater restrictions should exist on the admissibility of other acts.
71. 115 N.M. 514, 853 P.2d 1270 (Ct. App. 1993), cert. quashed, 115 N.M. 535, 854 P.2d 362
(1993).
72. Examples of such other exceptions to 404(B) include: intent, motive, plan and lack of mistake.
N.M. R. EvnD. 404(B).
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The decision in Lucero and its discussion in later cases indicates the
court's distaste for creating special exceptions, yet appears to encourage
wide latitude for prosecutors who can wedge prior acts evidence into one
of the established exceptions to Rule 404(B). While the court acknowledged
the difficulties of prosecuting a sexual molestation case, it refused to
help remedy the situation with a specific rule. 73 Despite this specific
prohibition New Mexico courts may still allow a wide variety of circumstances to satisfy the established exceptions to Rule 404(B). 74 The courts'
seeming refusal to support the adherence to the strictures of Rule 404(B)
obscures the current limits of admissibility to an even greater extent.
Additionally, the Lucero decision may result in inconsistent judgments;
without a specific exception to rely upon, the trial courts must decide
whether or not evidence is being permissibly or impermissibly manipulated
into one of the established exceptions. The results could potentially be
quite arbitrary, only adding to the quagmire that is Rule 404(B).
VI.

CONCLUSION

The court in Lucero saw an opportunity to reject the Rule 404(B)
"lewd and lascivious" exception, which would admit evidence of prior
acts with someone other than the prosecuting witness. The defendant's
ex-girlfriend's testimony as to intimate incidents between the two was
found irrelevant for any purpose other than propensity. Accordingly,
because the court struck down the "lewd and lascivious" exception, the
testimony did not fall under any other exception and was deemed inadmissible and highly prejudicial.
Such a decision perpetuates the problems the state faces in attempting
to prosecute sexual misconduct cases. How a court will decide on the
admissibility of prior acts evidence still remains a mystery for practitioners,
who retain only the established exceptions of Rule 404(B) and the balancing
act of Rule 403 as reliable tools of the trade.
SARAH B. COLLEY

73. The court might have considered creating a "lewd and lascivious" exception specifically in
the case of child sexual molestation, where the practical problems of prosecution are the greatest.
If such an exception were to exist, the defense would still have use of Rule 403 to avoid the
admission of evidence where the probative value was not substantially outweighed by the prejudicial
effect.
74. See Lamure, 115 N.M. at 65, 846 P.2d at 1074. The Lamure court ruled that the prior
acts evidence was "relevant and came within one or more of the exceptions, such as motive,
opportunity or intent." The court also noted that because propensity was not at issue in this case,
the evidence could not have been offered for that purpose. Id.

